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ABSTRACT

While muckrakers such as Upton Sinclair, Ernest Poole, Thomas Lawson, and others chose individual approaches for their investigative reporting to the public, they shared some common assumptions about mass communication that influenced the operative impact of their views. In addition to adhering to a simplistic belief in the power of bare facts, these writers calculated the receptivity of their audiences, searched for the prime conditions to present their messages, and measured reader response according to indexes they devised themselves. Effective strategies included sarcasm in praising those who voted for dishonest politicians, pretended innocence in conveying startling facts, a tombstone photograph for a patent medicine fraud expose, and emotion-packed descriptions and insinuations. The muckraker studied public opinion, frequently commenting on its power and abuses, on how to predict it and how to measure it; the ultimate goal in investigative reporting was effecting a change in American society. Response was solicited directly, through requests for letters of complaint to the company or government agency responsible for the problem and through the endorsements of readers by increased circulation of the magazine or newspaper that printed the report. (MAI)

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THE MASS COMMUNICATION "THEORIES" OF THE MUCKRAKERS

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THE MASS COMMUNICATION "THEORIES"
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Large claims for literary causes of socio-political effects accompany many historical events. Tom Paine's essays inspired George Washington's winter soldiers; Harriet Beecher Stowe's book emancipated the slaves; the New York Times drove Boss Tweed and the rest of the rascals from office, and Bernstein, Woodward, et al, forced Richard Nixon to resign the presidency.

And no period produced a greater array of large causal claims than the Muckraking Era, when a group of writers said they were "out to illuminate and inform public opinion and to cure these evils" by causing their audience to act.[1] A single writer, David Graham Phillips, is credited by an admiring scholar with unique influence on American politics, finance and society, and with direct effects including a significant role in the passage of the Sixteenth, Seventeenth and Nineteenth Amendments to the Constitution.[2]

The assumptions about causal links between magazine articles and legislation, for example, fall far short of rigorous standards of empirical proof. But lack of measurable effects or clear lines of causation has never stopped journalists or politicians from acting on the basis of their impressionistic beliefs. Sophisticated insights into economic influences on

the Civil War would not prevent Uncle Tom's Cabin from becoming an inspiration to muckrakers like Upton Sinclair. More elaborate explanations of the departures of Boss Tweed and Richard Nixon aside, journalistic exposures were seen as causal factors to the point of stimulating more of the same. Look backward at the Tweed case, a nineteenth century editor said,

> I imagine that the brilliant success of those attacks on the Tweed Ring has had something to do with the newspaper tendency which has developed so strongly in the last 25 years--that, namely, of finding something to expose.[3]

While the more fundamental search for solid evidence of causation deserves high priority, this study will examine beliefs about literary causes of social effects. Mass communication theories, as impressionistic as they might be, supplied ostensible motivation for the muckrakers and their counterparts in other eras. A close look at the communication assumptions expressed by the muckrakers provides a basis for discussion of the operative impact of their views.

Perhaps the most vivid episode of makeshift theorizing involved the gap between causal expectations and apparent effects experienced by Sinclair. The Jungle, we are told, enjoyed instantaneous success; "An immediate clamor began for reform."[4] Sinclair fully anticipated large effects, based on a definite model, Uncle Tom's Cabin, to which he attributed high causal significance in freeing the slaves. The leading non-participant historian of muckraking, Louis Filler, also treated Mrs. Stowe's book as a communication paradigm. After

its appearance, he claimed, more than a half century passed with no comparable model to serve the muckrakers.[5]

The large view of what a book can do explains the excitement a believer in the model might feel upon recognizing the birth of another such book. Jack London had high hopes when he announced his expectations for the effects of The Jungle.

> Here it is at last! The book we have been waiting for these many years! The Uncle Tom's Cabin of wage slavery! Comrade Sinclair's book The Jungle! And what Uncle Tom's Cabin did for black slaves, The Jungle has a large chance to do for the white slaves of today.[6]

The element of press agentry does not diminish interest in London's promotional broadside, considering that the parallels between the two books and two forms of slavery were quite likely suggested by Sinclair. Ernest Poole, a lesser-known muckraker, reinforces Sinclair's later claim that he had the Stowe model in mind from the start. Poole, who worked closely with Chicago stockyards strikers, viewed Sinclair as somewhat of an upstart.

> Into our headquarters one day breezed a lad in a wide-brimmed hat, with loose-flowing tie and a wonderful warm expansive smile. "Hello! I'm Upton Sinclair!" he said. "And I've come to write the Uncle Tom's Cabin of the Labor movement!"[7]

This improbable statement apparently ringing in his ears, Poole saw Sinclair two weeks later and asked, "Have you made a good start on your job?"

> "Start? I've finished!" he replied. "I've got all that I need to get on the spot and now I'm going home to write!" And so he wrote The Jungle, the Uncle Tom's Cabin of machine age.

Sinclair later found fault with such claims. Yes, he had fully intended such results, but the public response was not what he had expected. He explained, in an oft-quoted remark, "I aimed at the public's heart, and by accident I hit it in the stomach."[8] Emphasizing again that "I had Uncle Tom's Cabin in mind as a model of what I wished to do," he detailed his disappointment. "I am afraid that I failed," he said, in his attempt to "shake the country out of its slumber." Why? Because the model for success was not as applicable as he had assumed. "I might have succeeded," he mused, "if I had as good an opportunity as Mrs. Stowe had; but my task was much harder."

Sinclair then analyzed characteristics of "the life of the modern wage-slave" which made his story less effective, and "which made it infinitely harder" for Sinclair to be Stowe. But all his disclaimers hardly removed the model from mind or implied humility in the comparison. Commenting on booming sales of his book, Sinclair noted,

> But I protest mildly to those academic critics who think that the book is nothing but the sensation of a moment. I do not think that we have any book in American literature with the possible exception of Uncle Tom's Cabin, into the making of which more human anguish has entered.[9]

His discovery--"I hit it in the stomach"--produced nothing profound in the way of theories about reward-seeking audiences or selective perception. Sinclair simply recognized that "I do not eat much meat myself and my general attitude toward the matter was one of indifference."

The function of a model based on expectations of certain effects could have extreme implications. The muckraker might find his expectations fulfilled and remain highly motivated to continue the work; or he might find failure, lose faith in the power of his reporting model, and abandon investigative exposure. Despite setbacks, Sinclair apparently retained enough faith in his muckraking model to proceed; others saw their messages as sufficient cause, but blamed the audience for disappointing effects.

Consider, for example, the disillusionment of Thomas Lawson, the financier who exposed "Frenzied Finance." Introducing the hardbound version of his magazine series, he boasted,

> As a message it has had its influence. Indeed it is not an exaggeration to say that no man in his own generation has seen such a crop come forth from seed of his own sowing since the long bygone days when the wandering king planted dragons' teeth on the Phoenician plain and raised up an army of warriors.[10]

"The power of publicity had been triumphantly vindicated," he once exclaimed,[11] only to abandon exposure and later return to stock speculation, muttering his disgust with a public he then identified as "the saffron-blooded apes."[12]

Lawson's extreme hostility toward the audience was unusual, but he was not alone in divining audience conditions. Both muckrakers and their historians lean heavily on notions of an ill-defined public demand and an equally vague idea of the time being "ripe." They attribute a condition of receptiveness to the audience during the core muckraking era, 1902 to 1912. What made Ida Tarbell's "History of the Standard Oil Company"

more successful than H. D. Lloyd's Wealth Against Commonwealth? Both brought in detailed indictments against Standard Oil and John D. Rockefeller. The difference was not so much in the messages, the theorists answer, as in the time and a predisposed audience. Lloyd made little impact in 1894, Harvey Swados decided, because "the public was not 'ready' for it." Then, "A decade later, however, the public was ready."[13]

Historiographically, Swados' view may have been derived from Filler's estimate that Lloyd's Commonwealth "struck no such blow as Uncle Tom's Cabin . . . . It was premature." After the century turned, according to Filler, the stage was set for such muckraking to finally succeed.

> Reviewing in perspective the failures of the earlier critics, and with a more experienced public to hear what they had to say, they could point their criticisms as never before. If they were long overdue, now at last the times were ripe for them, and ripe with a vengeance.[14]

The retrospective historians share this assumption about the predisposition of the audience with the participant historians, and the metaphor of ripeness appears often alongside such rhetoric as I. F. Marcosson's claim for the readers of David Graham Phillips' "Treason of the Senate" series: "Nor was the public unprepared for the strong meat that Phillips handed them."[15]

Unlike Sinclair, who expected to shock an innocent audience with new facts, S. S. McClure of McClure's Magazine described the origins of muckraking in more reciprocal terms.

> It came from no formulated plan to attack existing institutions, but was the result of merely taking up in the magazines some of the problems that were beginning to interest the people a little before the newspapers and magazines took them up.[16]

Ida Tarbell seconded McClure's version of audience influence, and another staff writer, Ray Stannard Baker, offered similar reflections on a public suspicious of wrongdoings "which were largely unsubstantiated."[17] The time was ripe, in other words, for the muckrakers to provide substantiation. They were in the substantiating business rather than the Uncle Tom's Cabin business. Did the public demand it? "Month after month," Baker claimed, the public "would swallow dissertations of ten or twelve thousand words without even blinking--and ask for more."[18]

The condition of the audience impressed Mark Sullivan, too. Once Lincoln Steffens' "Shame of the Cities" series began, Sullivan recalled, Steffens

> . . .could not cover all the cities that clamored for his attention. 'Clamored' is the suitable word; a remarkable feature of that series was that cities, or many citizens in them, seemed to take a morbid pleasure in being included. They wrote letters to McClure's crying, "Expose us us next!"[19]

Sullivan complained about a banker-adviser to Collier's, who thought the magazine could instruct the public on subjects entirely of its choosing. "He could never see that a periodical needed to reflect the public," Sullivan chided, "or share the public's mood."[20] Lawson's complaint against the people made a further distinction: he found the public quite

ready for his attack on "The System," but ill-prepared for his solution. "My remedy. . .I will print in Everybody's Magazine," he sniffed, "when I judge the people are ready to receive it."[21]

The muckrakers did not stop with general notions of a ripe time and a ready public. They offered more detailed predictions about the effects of their messages. They looked more closely at prime conditions for receiving their messages, and they "measured" the response by their own indices. Theories explained which message characteristics overcame audience resistance or reinforced predispositions. And the theories were more complex than suggested by Baker's account of infinite appetites for long "dissertations." In regard to the message as a variable, historians have argued that the muckrakers held simplistic beliefs in the power of bare facts. Judson A. Grenier emphasized their alleged belief "in the ability of the 'people' to correct a social evil once the facts were out."[22]

Before taking exception to this allegation, it must be acknowledged that ample evidence supports it; simple revelation of raw data often seems to be the sum of their communication theory. Steffens wrote,

> I respect reporting. I have great ideas of what can be done by telling the facts and stories of life about us. I would have The American report and report and report.[23]

But even a belief in the cold stacking of facts could stem from a more calculated strategy. Baker replied to an angry reader who wondered at his restraint in the face of great villainry.

> What he wanted was "red-hot invective." I remember thinking considerably about this letter, finally suggesting to my critic that if I became angry, or showed it, he wouldn't. If I "blew off," wouldn't he feel relieved, even satisfied; wouldn't he be tempted to do nothing more about it? But with the ugly facts, the complete picture, the truth, vividly and dispassionately set forth, wouldn't he and other honest men be stirred to the point of doing something about it themselves?[24]

Sinclair, in lamenting his topic's variance from the Stowe model, argued the advantages of black slavery as a more picturesque subject than the mechanical life of the "modern wage slave." Thus, he had "so much less opportunity for color and brightness, for humor and adventure, such as a popular book must have." Sinclair was "warned by my friends that the sheer horror of The Jungle would kill it."[25] Charles Edward Russell, on the other hand, believed that Sinclair held an inherent advantage over his own attacks on the packers, because "people would at any time rather take their exposé stuff in fiction."[26]

Mark Sullivan's campaign to break the power of House Speaker Joe Cannon purportedly used "every possible device of polemic journalism," but the author consciously adopted a particular strategy for influencing his audience. Sullivan continuously and creatively praised the Insurgents, a name he claims to have first applied to the anti-Cannon Congressmen. With photographs labeled "The Twelve Men of Courage," he printed the names of counties which elected the Insurgents. Why praise these citizens? Readers were told,

> . . .because the loyal backing of their constituents is as much entitled to recognition as the personal courage of the members; the counties named in this list have better reason to be proud of their representatives than any other constituencies.[27]

In that reminiscence, Sullivan viewed himself as a clever Machiavellian communicator. By contrast, Steffens played the innocent-at-large when he claimed that his writings "were effective because I set out on my search with all the taught ignorance of my day," which "put the astonishment" into his reports.[28]

But almost any synthesis of such notions is apt to fall short of their full variety--a range surpassing anything suggested by historians who contend that beliefs were limited to a primitive stimulus-response theory. A survey of effects notions will find Edward Bok, for example, discussing the "deadly force" of a single photograph employed in the campaign against patent medicine frauds. The photo showed the tombstone of a long-dead Lydia Pinkham, whose customers had continued to correspond with her regularly. Bok judged it "one of the most effective pieces of copy that the magazine used in the campaign."[29] But the editor of the Ladies Home Journal allowed himself few illusions about instant and uniform stimulus and response; he did not depend on the bare facts to prod his audience to effective action. His campaign for better Pullman cars, while hardly the ultimate muckraking crisis, illustrates his strategy. Believing reports of Pullman car conditions were just the first step, Bok cooperated with railroad journals

in other approaches to the problem. He also encouraged readers to complain to conductors, and, when the railroads took notice, assigned architects to advise on improvements.[30] Bok mixed multiple tactics in most of his campaigns, including a much-protested assault on the unmentionable problem of venereal disease.[31]

Sullivan also went beyond hoping for reader response. He recruited letters by repeatedly running a form letter designed for easy mailing to Congressmen. The letters demanded a stand on Speaker Cannon; when the representatives replied, their constituents often mailed the responses back to Sullivan, who printed them with his comments.[32] Lawson went a step further in directly leading the audience toward effective action. While urging readers to demand restitution from insurance companies and other culprits accused of speculating with John Doe's money, he printed proxy forms alongside his articles. The plan was direct: Insurance policy-holders should sign their shares over to Lawson until he accumulated enough proxies to overthrow the corrupt regime. He did not quite gain control, but collected an impressive 16,000 proxies representing $54,000,000 in policies.[33]

The muckrakers became most elaborate in their articulation of abstract communication theories when they commented on public opinion: its power, its abuses, how to predict it, how to measure it, and so on. An early critic of muckraking, editor Ellery Sedgwick, provided a capsule summary of the concept of public opinion in that first decade of the twentieth century.

> A country which is governed by public opinion is governed by the men who spread it. One of the most interesting phenomena of late years is the growth of the influence of magazines in the field formerly monopolized by the daily papers. Magazines entered the province of journalism with certain great advantages in the work of forming public opinion. They are not bound by party affiliations. They may select the questions which they think themselves qualified to treat. The intervals which elapse between their publication dates imply a deliberate and dispassionate investigation of the facts.[34]

Public opinion, clearly and with emphasis, was important. The question might be asked, of course, just what public opinion was. The answer often amounted to this: public opinion was whatever a public opinion expert said it was. And there were experts to consult at several levels.

McClure was a great editor, according to Sullivan, because he was "a sensitive barometer of the moods of the time he lived in, . . . a supernatural senser of what people felt and thought."[35] Steffens put it another way, citing an office conversation with McClure.

> "Look," he said. "I want to know if you enjoy a story because, if you do, then I know that, say, ten thousand readers will like it. If Miss Tarbell likes a thing, it means that fifty thousand will like it. That's something to go by. But I go most by myself. For if I like a thing, then I know that millions will like it. My mind and my taste are so common that I'm the best editor. . . . There's only one editor better than I am, and that's Frank Munsey. If he likes a thing, then everybody will like it."[36]

These human barometers, however, had to try harder; they were a distant second to the top public opinion analyst of their time: Theodore Roosevelt. Baker described the president as "probably the keenest living judge of trends of American opinion."[37]

Not only could the Rough Rider read trends, he could make them. George Creel, the muckraker who later led the World War I Committee on Public Information, believed that Roosevelt's historic speech labeling the muckrakers and attacking them for negativism was effective as a presidential mirror of public opinion.

> . . .the effects of his turnabout were plain to be seen. Editors had gone off the raw-meat diet, convinced that Roosevelt's speech reflected a more conservative public opinion.[38]

If the audience response was invisible to the naked eyes of the editors, they assumed Roosevelt had seen it clearly.

His anti-muckraking polemic, by the way, signaled no letup in Roosevelt's long-running personal dialogue with the magazine writers. He continued to exchange letters with several of them, invite them to his office and farm, and offer them his latest insights into communication theory. Roosevelt once told Bok, "I envy you your power with the public." How so, the editor wondered, in light of the apparent power of the presidency? Roosevelt elaborated:

> "When do I get the ear of the public? In its busiest moments. My messages are printed in the newspapers and read hurriedly. . . . Women hardly ever read them, I should judge. Now you are read in the evening by the fireside or under the lamp, when the day's work is over and the mind is at rest from other things and receptive to what you offer."[39]

In addition to the designation of public opinion experts, the notion of other ranks of opinion leaders received some attention. Lawson, in telling readers about his heavy mail, pointedly headed the list of correspondents with

"teachers of the word of God."[40] But more important than clergymen, according to Cosmopolitan, were the country editors. Phillips' "Treason of the Senate" attracted perhaps the harshest rebuttals from high places of any muckraking series. It was widely considered to be the straw that broke the president's patience and prompted his anti-muckraking speech. So Cosmopolitan countered with the country editors. The magazine's "tidal wave of correspondence" included 673 heavily favorable letters, notes and post cards from editors of "small daily and weekly journals." And with good reason.

> Now those who have studied the social mind of the country and what actuates it will tell you that the country editor is one of the strongest representatives of whatever latent power of opinion we have in America.[41]

Even without the aid of country editors, most muckrakers were expert enough, it seemed, to "measure" the more obvious "effects" of their articles. They could count circulation increases, read the heavy mail, hear high officials confirm the impact, watch voters turn rascals out, follow court actions against the targets of their exposures, and finally applaud the passage of new laws. If it did not always occur to a writer that his series might not be the single and sufficient cause of these apparent effects, at least he saw what appeared to be solid evidence of results. The historians of muckraking have also used such evidence loosely; in the most notable case, several have concluded that investigative exposures sent circulation soaring, particularly for McClure's. This conclusion has been described as "one of the most persistent myths in the literature dealing with muckraking."[42]

While increased circulation was apparent at times and pleased the muckrakers, they seemed more impressed with the evidence of reaction provided by the mail bags. "One of the best proofs," Baker observed, "of the value of these articles, was the extraordinary demand for the magazines on the newsstands and the sudden increase of subscriptions."[43] But the letters were proof of another magnitude, Baker added.

> In those early days of the popular magazine, "fan letters" had not become an accepted prodigy as they have since then, and they were welcomed by both publishers and authors as veritable signs in the skies.[44]

As noted earlier, Lawson, Cosmopolitan editors and others put their signs from the skies to work at the grass roots.

If letters were divine endorsements, statements by public officials proclaiming the effectiveness of muckraking were final proof of impact. Sullivan's campaign against Speaker Cannon was no lonely voice crying in the wilderness; the Insurgents played some part in the affair. But Sullivan can hardly be blamed for claiming a causal role when Congressman McCall stood just before the crucial vote and announced,

> "This movement does not originate in the House of Representatives. You are about to do the behest of a gang of literary highwaymen who are entirely willing to assassinate a character in order to sell a magazine."[45]

The muckrakers' autobiographies swarm with such credits--both hostile and friendly--from high places. The ultimate focus on effects, however, centered on the claimed influence for change in the American society.

The voters responded to "Treason of the Senate," I. F.

Marcosson claimed, as "man after man whom Phillips had held up to censure retired and better men took their places."[46] Suit after suit and indictment upon indictment brought beef packers, Standard Oil, insurance companies and others to court in the wake of muckraking exposures . . . and their wake won credit. Wall Street shook in Lawson's wake, so why look further for the cause of a tremor popularly termed "the Lawson panic?" Laws allegedly passed "as the result of" magazine articles were legion. A partial listing of legislation often attributed to muckraking would start with trusts in general and continue through a wide range of regulatory restraints from railroads to patent medicine. But it would be misleading to suggest that all observers drew straight theoretical lines from the magazine series to the legislative action. Just as often, the causal claim simply attributed secondary influence to other factors.

For example, the vivid role of The Jungle overshadowed an array of likely influences in the pure food episode. Roosevelt was clearly predisposed toward concern about unsanitary meat; he suffered through a bad meat incident with his troops in Cuba during the Spanish-American War. Public confidence in the meat packers may have already been undermined by earlier exposures. Russell's attack on the Beef Trust began in February, 1905, a full year before publication of The Jungle; Collier's took up the question in April. By the end of July, Armour and other leaders were indicted and sentenced for conspiracy to restrain trade, although the conviction was later reversed. In December, Roosevelt's annual message featured

a plea for pure food legislation; a senator immediately reintroduced a previously defeated food bill. Meanwhile, Russell recalls, cattlemen, produce commission men and others continued agitating against the food industry--all before Sinclair's sensation raising that "immediate clamor" for reform. The Jungle's place in this uproar? "The most efficient aid," Russell advises.[47]

Of all the era's efforts to articulate communication beliefs, the words of Russell and Ida Tarbell sound most receptive to the possibility of a complex, obscure, accumulative process. Russell wrote of the "vast, silent, often mysterious, sometimes hardly discernible processes" that produce change.[48] Tarbell offers more than obligatory humility in her evaluation of a career highlighted by her Standard Oil series.

> I have never had illusions about the value of my individual contribution! I realized early that what a man or woman does is built on what those who have gone before have done, that its real value depends on making the matter in hand a little clearer, a little sounder for those who come after. Nobody begins or ends anything. Each person is a link, weak or strong, in an endless chain. One of our gravest mistakes is persuading ourselves that nobody has passed this way before.[49]

At the start of this discussion, it was suggested that impressionistic theories could lead muckrakers in extreme directions. Their notions could lead to conclusions about great power to effect change, or to the frustration of an assumed ineffectuality. In either direction, the notions of cause and effect, of prime conditions for messages and audiences, or the

roles of opinion leaders and other variables, provide more than the mere curiosity of a mythology. They provide one key to the alleged effectiveness of investigative exposure during a period which has been viewed as the height of journalistic influence in America.[50]

Where did the belief in great effectiveness lead? For Lincoln Steffens, his apparent record of influence seemed to place the power to effect change right in his lap, and the arousal of public opinion seemed almost an irrelevant side effect rather than the medium for change. Finley Peter Dunne's Mr. Dooley poked fun at "L. S.'s Employment Bureau." Dooley mused that office-seekers were required to appy to the "Polly-tickal Intelligence Office set up by me frind Lincoln Steffens. No wan can get a job without a charackter fr'm him."[51]

Steffens' assumption of influence, supported by his personal access to several presidents, reached a climax with his direct intervention in foreign affairs. Lacking the time to use a public forum, he demanded an audience with Woodrow Wilson when another U.S. invasion of Mexico seemed imminent. The president received Steffens, heard him, and responded, "You have given me information, very valuable information, information which prevents a war." Having prevented one war, Steffens wondered if Wilson would not "let me in every time when I see you are making a mistake and think I have information---."[52] Wilson cut off the question and Steffens knew he was being presumptuous. But the presumption was based on his apparent success in delivering messages which aroused public opinion to demand action. Why

not be more efficient and remove the audience role for quicker results?

Frustration faced those who came to pessimistic conclusions when results failed to meet their expectations. Some, Sam McClure among them, developed theories of diminishing returns. McClure, complaining that "It did not seem to me that people were roused as they ought to be," concluded that some sort of immunity had intervened. Noting Chicagoans' apathy to daily news of crime, he said, "I have observed that people will become accustomed to almost any environment."[53] For "permanent results," Tarbell, his longtime associate, decided, "the mind must be convinced" rather than the emotions.[54]

As these varied views indicate, there is no obvious pattern that permits pigeonholing of the muckrakers' notions about the mass communication process. While Sinclair could adopt Uncle Tom's Cabin as a model of overwhelming conversion, others accepted a slow trickle of minimal change or even a more pessimistic theory of futility. At the very least, it would be misleading to think of the leading figures of the Muckraking Era as innocent believers in a hypodermic stimulus that produced a uniform response. Their beliefs and impressions were far more elaborate--as sophisticated, a skeptic might suggest, as the beliefs of the investigative reporters of the 1970s, whose messages are regularly credited as causal forces on behalf of the most dramatic changes in our society.

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42. Peter Lyon, Success Story; The Life and Times of S. S. McClure (New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1963), 251. Ayer's figures deflate the circulation claims made so often by distinguished historians.

43. Baker, 168.

44. Baker, 239.

45. Sullivan, 261.

46. Marcosson, 241.

47. Russell, 139.

48. Ibid., 427.

49. Ida Tarbell, All in the Day's Work (New York: Macmillan, 1939), 400.

50. See, for example, Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform (New York: Vintage Books, 1955).

51. Finley Peter Dunne, "The Power of the Press," American Magazine, October, 1906, 612. Dunne and Steffens were co-workers then on the American.

52. Steffens, 739-40.

53. McClure, 256-58.

54. Tarbell, 242.